CleanSlate 
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RE: The Obsidian (ODN) Thread
From the white paper, I assume you were looking at this part:
Quote:Crowdfunding distributions
The initial ODN coin premine was 98,000,004 million ODN up to block 2.
For the crowdfunding, without bonuses, the headline exchange rate for ODN coins was fixed at:
● 1 BTC = 21433 ODN or 1 ETH = 2192 ODN.
● 15% ODN (14.7 million coins) were distributed among the members of the core team.
● 25% ODN (24.5 million coins) are being used by the Company for licensing, integration, marketing, advertising, ongoing development and other operational expenses.
● 60% ODN (58.8 million coins) were initially offered to the interested parties in the
crowdfunding, which was updated on 1st August 2017 with a public statement, so that
instead:
○ 30% ODN (29.4 million coins) were offered to the interested parties in the
crowdfunding.
■ from which 20.6 million coins will be distributed for contributions
■ and 8.8 million coins will be burned on the 30th September 2017
○ 30% ODN (29.4 million coins) were reserved for VC funding and strategic
partnerships.
Although 30% were released in the crowdsale, you can see what the other portion is being allocated for.
While this can be a potential problem in a proof-of-work coin, in which case a 51% attack can happen, I don't think you truly understand the difference between that and a proof-of-stake coin. Proof-of-stake is designed to prevent such attacks on the blockchain.
Here's some more reading for you to do:
Quote:Motivation For Proof of Stake
A proof-of-stake system might provide increased protection from a malicious attack on the network. Additional protection comes from two sources:
1) Executing an attack would be much more expensive. 2) Reduced incentives for attack. The attacker would need to own a near majority of all bitcoin. Therefore, the attacker suffer severely from his own attack.
When block rewards are produced through txn fees, a proof of stake system would result in lower equilibrium txn fees. Lower long-run fees would increase the competitiveness of bitcoin relative to alternative payments systems. Intuitively reduced fees are due to vast reductions in the scale of wastage of resources.
The Monopoly Problem
If a single entity (hereafter a monopolist) took control of the majority of txn verification resources, he could use these resources to impose conditions on the rest of the network. Potentially, the monopolist could choose to do this in malicious ways, such as double spending or denying service. If the monopolist chose a malicious strategy and maintained his control for a long period, confidence in bitcoin would be undermined and bitcoin purchasing power would collapse. Alternatively, the monopolist could choose to act benevolently. A benevolent monopolist would exclude all other txn verifiers from fee collection and currency generation, but would not try to exploit currency holders in any way. In order to maintain a good reputation, he would refrain from double spends and maintain service provision. In this case, confidence in Bitcoin could be maintained under monopoly since all of its basic functionality would not be affected.
Both benevolent and malevolent monopoly are potentially profitable, so there are reasons to suspect that an entrepreneurial miner might attempt to become a monopolist at some point. Due to the Tragedy of the Commons effect, attempts at monopoly become increasingly likely over time.
How Proof of Stake Addresses Monopoly Problems
Monopoly is still possible under proof-of-stake. However, proof-of-stake would be more secure against malicious attacks for two reasons.
Firstly, proof-of-stake makes establishing a verification monopoly more difficult. At the time of writing, an entrepreneur could achieve monopoly over proof-of-work by investing at most 10 million USD in computing hardware. The actual investment necessary might be less than this because other miners will exit as difficulty increases, but it is difficult to predict exactly how much exit will occur. If price remained constant in the face of extremely large purchases (unlikely), such an entrepreneur would need to invest at least 20 million USD to obtain monopoly under proof-of-stake. Since such a large purchase would dramatically increase bitcoin price, the entrepreneur would likely need to invest several times this amount. Thus, even now proof-of-stake monopoly would be several-fold more costly to achieve than proof-of-work monopoly. Over time the comparison of monopoly costs will become more and more dramatic. The ratio of bitcoin's mining rewards to market value is programmed to decline exponentially. As this happens, proof-of-work monopoly will become easier and easier to obtain, whereas obtaining proof-of-stake monopoly will become progressively more difficult as more of the total money supply is released into circulation.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a proof-of-stake monopolist is more likely to behave benevolently exactly because of his stake in Bitcoin. In a benevolent monopoly, the currency txn continue as usual, but the monopolist earns all txn fees and coin generations. Other txn verifiers are shut out of the system, however. Since mining is not source of demand for bitcoin, bitcoin might retain most of its value in the event of a benevolent attack. Earnings from a benevolent attack are similar regardless of whether the attack occurs under proof-of-stake or proof-of-work. In a malicious attack, the attacker has some outside opportunity which allows profit from bitcoin's destruction (simple double-spends are not a plausible motivation; ownership of a competing payment platform is). At the same time, the attacker faces costs related to losses on bitcoin-specific investments which are necessary for the attack. It can be assumed that a malicious attack causes the purchasing power of bitcoin to fall to zero. Under such an attack, the proof-of-stake monopolist will lose his entire investment. By contrast, a malicious proof-of-work monopolist will be able to recover much of their hardware investment through resale. Recall also, that the necessary proof-of-work investment is much smaller than the proof-of-stake investment. Thus, the costs of a malicious attack are several-fold lower under proof-of-work. The low costs associated with malicious attack make a malicious attack more likely to occur.
Source: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_Stak...y_Problems
And here's a comparison between PoW and PoS:
Quote:In the near future, Ethereum plans to switch from Proof-of-Work (PoW) based mining to Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mining. While both PoW and PoS are algorithms for reaching consensus on the blockchain, they go about it in different ways.
Since anyone can create a block, there needs to be a way that everyone on the blockchain can reach consensus, deciding together what block accurately represents recent transactions across the network. Without a central authority, trust comes from creating consensus algorithms that are very, very hard to cheat.
Proof-of-Work
Proof-of-Work happens through miners trying to solve exceptionally difficult math problems. Finding a solution is basically a guessing game, but checking if a solution is correct is easy. Miners aren’t able to cheat the system because it takes real-world resources to work out these solutions.
That’s where a main issue with PoW stems from: these real-world resources are computers and electricity. It takes a lot of power to run the computers, or clusters of computers, that calculate different potential solutions. From an ecological standpoint, this isn’t ideal. This leads miners to have high energy costs and this is bad for the environment.
The fact that you need a serious amount of computing power, more than the average person could afford, or would even be able to work with, means the mining community is getting smaller and more exclusive. This goes against the idea of decentralization, and could potentially lead to a 51% attack.
51% Attack
A 51% attack is when a miner, or more likely a mining pool, controls 51% of the network’s computational power. With that ability, they could invalidate valid transactions and double spend funds. They’d achieve this through creating and confirming their own fraudulent blocks, and do it so quickly, the rest of the mining community creating genuine blocks would have their legitimate work invalidated.
That’s where PoS could really help. Even if someone owned 51% of a digital currency, it would not be in their interest to attack something in which they have a majority share. Also, it’s very unlikely that anyone would be interested in buying up 51% of a currency, due to it being prohibitively expensive. According to game theory, those with a larger stake in a cryptocurrency should want to maintain a secure network. Any attack would only serve to destabilize the digital currency, diminishing the value of their stake.
Proof-of-Stake
PoS happens by a miner putting up a stake, or locking up an amount of their coins, to verify a block of transactions. The cryptographic calculations in PoS are much simpler for computers to solve: you only need to prove you own a certain percentage of all coins available in a given currency. For example, if you somehow owned 2% of all Ether (ETH), you’d be able to mine 2% of all transactions across Ethereum.
PoS would be a more fair system than PoW, as technically anyone could become a miner. PoS offers a linear scale regarding the percentage of blocks a miner could confirm, since it’s based on that person’s stake in the cryptocurrency. That means someone with ten times more coins (e.g. - $10,000 vs. $1,000) would only mine ten times more blocks. Under PoW protocols, spending ten times as much money on mining hardware will produce higher computational power logarithmically, allow for more equipment due to the nature of reduced prices when buying in bulk, and might provide further advantages since highly expensive equipment often functions exponentially better than less expensive counterparts.
Switching to PoS could help to encourage more community participation in Ethereum, as well as aid decentralization. Taking mining out of the hands of the few pools of GPU farms doing the bulk of mining, which somewhat resembles an oligopoly, would distribute the work evenly across the network, leading to a more democratized system.
Source: https://www.ethnews.com/proof-of-work-vs...-explained
Take the above info for what you will.
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